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Prospects for Approving a Trade Agreement
and Granting Most Favored Nation Status to
the People's Republic of China
by Charles A.

Vanik *

of InterOUTSET, the Case Western Reserve Journal
THE Law
ATnational
is to be congratulated for its timely issue on China.
Sino-American relations are evolving very rapidly and the need for
thoughtful and scholarly discussions of the legal relations between our
two countries has never been more relevant.
I believe the United States will conclude a trade agreement with
the People's Republic of China (PRC) this year, and that Congress will
extend most favored nation (MFN) status to China this year. My Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means visited
China between March 22 and April 2 of 1979 as part of a follow-up to
Secretary Blumenthal's earlier trade discussions. This mission by eleven
members of the Trade Subcommittee at the invitation of the PRC
government enabled us to prepare for consideration a trade agreement
and trade legislation to be enacted, possibly during the Summer of 1979.
Having stated my hope that there will be a trade agreement and
my belief that the Congress will approve it, I would like to offer a
number of caveats and observations.
First,, the PRC-Vietnam conflict threw considerable cold water on
the initial flush of enthusiasm that accompanied the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC. We are
dealing with a country which is capable of sudden and breath-taking
reversals of course. Some of the'current leaders are elderly; it is
unclear how firm their policies are or how long they will be applied.
Further military adventures, political flip-flops, or draconian internal
repressions could destroy the public's and the Congress' commitment to
a trade agreement, even at the last minute.
Second, commercially, the "normalization of political relations"
with the PRC created great excitement among American businessmen,
"a sort of oil for the lamps of China" romanticisim; there was a great
rushing around among businessmen similar to the visits to Cuba of a
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year and a half ago. Now, with the news of the cancellation of major
contracts with the Japanese and a better understanding of China's
finances (the average per capita GNP of the Chinese is less than a
dollar a day!), our business and trade expectations should be a little
more realistic.
Thus, I suspect that some of the business-agricultural pressures for
normalization of relations with the PRC will quickly cool. The rush to
trade may become a more thoughtful debate than the rush to political
relations.
Third, since it appears that the Chinese are permitting family
reunifications, and that there has been a dramatic increase in the level
of emigration (2,000 per month compared to 25 to 30 a month a year
ago), then the Jackson-Vanik amendment requirements relating to the
right to emigrate can be met. We do, however, need more information
on this situation. The debate on the Taiwan "Institute" brought out
numerous horror stories about human rights conditions -in China, particularly in areas such as Tibet. The Amnesty International report of
last Autumn helps remind us that we are dealing with an extraordinarily
arbitrary society. The writings of Chen Jo-hsi (e.g., The Execution of
Mayor Yin) also help remind us of the costs of the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, unless the current policy of apparent liberalization
is just another "let a hundred flowers bloom" phenomena, the
Freedom of Emigration requirements of the 1974 Trade Act will probably be resolved.
Fourth, I believe the claims settlement reached by Secretary
Blumenthal will be acceptable. I would only note that I find it very
unfortunate that special interests succeeded in placing in the Trade
Act of 1974 a requirement that our claims settlement with
Czechoslovakia must be 100 cents on the dollar-a requirement imposed
on no other defeated World War II country and a requirement which
has prevented an improvement of relations with that important Eastern
European country. I hope that the precedent of settling with the PRC
on forty-one cents on the dollar (the same proportion the Czechs
agreed to at least six years ago) will enable us to reconsider the legislation which has effectively barred normalization of relations with
Czechoslovakia.
Fifth, a complication in any trade "normalization" with the PRC
will be their willingness to negotiate a textile and apparel bilateral
agreement pursuant to the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA). In the past
Congress the Textile Caucus, an informal coalition of members of the
House and Senate concerned about problems in the textile and apparel
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industry, clearly demonstrated their ability to shape and control trade
legislation in the Congress. Whether or not you agree with the
economic concepts of the MFA and textile and apparel quotas, the
political power of this industry, with its 2.3 million workers, is a fact of
life. I raise this point, because one of the principal goals of the textile
and apparel industry in the past few years has been to obtain a
bilateral quota with the PRC or otherwise bring textile items (which
are the PRC's second major foreign exchange earner) under controls.
While the level of imports from the PRC has been relatively low (one
to two per cent of United States textile imports), the domestic industry
lives in fear of the enormous potential of the PRC in this labor
intensive area. There is a fear that the PRC could quickly target vast
quantities of apparel to the United States market and could price these
items at whatever the state decreed so as to obtain foreign exchange.,
The domestic industry therefore has sought to obtain a quota ceiling
on imports from the PRC as early as possible-before they build up a
large historic supply base and then insist that that high, historic base
should be where quota level negotiations commence. Again, one can
argue whether the fear of massive imports from the PRC is
justifiabile-but one cannot argue about the existence of the fear or of
the political power of the domestic industry. Thus, I believe that
before a trade agreement can be finalized, there will have to be a clear
understanding that the United States has obtained a "satisfactory" textile and apparel bilateral agreement with the PRC. The terms of this
bilateral agreement are currently being negotiated, but it is slow going
and at the time of this writing, the results have been highly unsatisfactory.
As a corollary, of course, textile and apparel limits imposed on
the PRC by both the European Community and the United States will
limit the PRC's ability to buy from the West-and further temper
business interest in China.
Finally, as the author in the House of Representatives of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment, I am deeply concerned about the implications-the possible backlash-which could develop in the Soviet Union
I

The ability of the PRC to undersell others, even at non-MFN rates is striking.

In a trade publication for the men's wear industry the following example was cited:
"Landed cost is certainly one inducement according to Sam Ko of Grace Garments.
Even with 37.5% duty on cotton pants (versus 16.5% for Hong Kong origin), Grace's
Chinese production has a landed cost of about $6.00 HK ($1.28 U.S.) versus $6.30 HK
($1.34 U.S.) for Hong Kong pants." Daily News Record, Jan. 25, 1979, at 6.
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from granting MFN status to the PRC prior to considering MFN for
the Soviet Union. This issue is particularly sensitive, because the Soviet
Union has been very quietly but very dramatically improving its
emigration climate for more than a year. To ignore the change in the
Soviet Union while rushing to embrace a little understood PRC
emigration policy is simply "undiplomatic." Therefore, it is my hope
that we consider MFN for the Soviet Union at the same time or prior
to any MFN trade agreement with the PRC.
The problem of extending MFN to the Soviet Union and dealing
with the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment has centered
around the requirement in section 402(c)(1)(B) of the 1974 Trade Act
that the President "has received assurances that the emigration practices of that country will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of this [Freedom of Emigration] section."
It has become clear since the passage of the Trade Act that the
Soviet Union will not make any public promise to America relating to
immigration policy. However, if the Carter Administration can in some
form obtain information indicating that present policies are a trend
toward immigration policy improvement, the President may be in a
position to advise the Congress that he believes the immigration policy
has improved and that he has reason to expect a trend toward a better
climate. Under these circumstances, Congress may approve a one year
waiver and liberalize trade with the Soviet Union.
It is my opinion that an even-handed approach to both the Soviet
Union and China would be in the best interests of America. It is my
further belief that the simultaneous submission of both cases would
facilitate both actions. It is also my belief that this action would constructively help the congressional consideration of the SALT
agreement-in a sense "clear the road" for approval. The task concerning either China or the Soviet Union will not be an easy legislative
matter. There is a growing, substantial group of House members,
perhaps as many as 150, who philosophically oppose any improved or
increased relations with any communist or non-market-economy country.
In the trade decisions involving both the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China, I hope that the Administration will decide
to resolve the issue by utilizing the Trade Act of 1974 rather than by
endeavoring to modify the human rights provisions. As far as I am
concerned, these provisions are in concrete form as a basic part of our
law, applicable to all nations. The moral achievement of the legislation cannot be reversed.
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If the Administration decides on human rights modifications, normalized trade relationships will certainly be delayed by two years or
more because of congressional deliberation. On the other hand, utilization of the Trade Act procedures could achieve congressional approval
this year.
This then, is where I believe the Congress now stands on the issue
of trade with China and the Soviet Union. The year 1979 will be one
of trade decisions, involving both the just-concluding Tokyo Round
multilateral trade negotiations and East-West trade relations.
I am sure that the Journal's work on China will help us in considering some of these momentous questions. Your work in this area is appreciated.

